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That the reduction in the length of the working week 
seems to be the preferred means of combatting unemployment is 
symptomatic of an evolution which has led European governments 
to an acceptance of a permanently lower level of economic ac­
tivity, and to formulate policies most aptly described at an 
international level as "competition by deflation". The logic 
of work sharing is the adaptation of the supply of labour to 
the existing amount of employment. It is therefore a redis­
tribution of a given amount of unemployment.
If it is to be a genuine social advance, the reduction in 
the working week should be accompanied by a change in the dis­
tribution of income between all social groups. But when seen 
as an employment policy, it clearly implies only a redistribu­
tion of the existing wage bill between the employed and unem­
ployed .
In this article, we investigate the conditions necessary 
for the success of such a policy and its probable effects on 
employment. The results of the simulations of econometric 
models which have been performed for a number of European 
countries— similar for the most part— are then analysed. But 
despite these efforts of quantification, a great uncertainty 
remains as to the effects of such a policy on both production 
processes and the behaviour of agents. Moreover a further 
theoretical and empirical analysis of these effects leads us 
to doubt that the reduction in the length of the working week 





















































































































































































ADJUSTING TO COMPETITIVE DEPRESSION:
THE CASE OF THE REDUCTION IN WORKING TIME
Jean-Paul Fitoussi, Professor at the European University
Institute
and
Daniel Szpiro, Director of Studies at the "Observatoire 
Français des Conjonctures Economiques"
Worsening unemployment in an inflationary context has 
weakened the credibility of growth as a policy for solving 
the employment problem. The non-cooperative character of 
international relations, which exacerbates the external 
"constraint", leads governments, whatever be their initial 
intentions, to adopt, more or less explicitly, restrictive 
policies. To increase unemployment becomes a substitute 
for protectionism, an instrument serving a higher-order ob­
jective: balancing external trade and defending the ex­
change rate.
On the global level, however, the crisis is of a 
Keynesian nature: the restrictive policies pursued in most
Western countries have been combined notably with the fact 
that in the newly industrialized countries purchasing power 
corresponding to the recently installed production capacity 
has not been created. On the level of a developed country, 
it can be analysed in terms of insufficient competitivity 
(excessive wage costs) and/or of structural maladaptation . 
of the productive apparatus. The fact that most developed 




























































































drawn attention to the inadequacy of that argument or at least 
encouraged more cooperative economic policies. The present 
strategy leads to a "low pressure" equilibrium in the world 
economy, which implies that any attempt at recovery in a sin­
gle country is condemned to failure. The existence of a re­
serve of unemployment seems inescapable. According to a re­
cent memorandum from the Commission of the European Communi­
ties, stabilizing the rate of unemployment at around 11% of 
the working population (12 million unemployed) would need a 
growth rate above 3%. This seems impossible in the short term 
and unlikely in the medium term.
In such a context, with investment possibilities reduced 
by low growth prospect, the problem of employment becomes that 
of a voluntary or constrained reduction in the supply of la­
bour. An arithmetical illusion makes it look as if 8 men 
working 6 hours should give the same productive contribution 
as 6 men working 8 hours. Hence the idea of substituting one 
type of rationing for another. On the labour market, the ex­
istence of unemployment implies that the economic system spon­
taneously chooses one particular rationing scheme: those of­
fering their labour are either totally satisfied or totally 
excluded from productive activity. Economic theory is practi­
cally silent on the reasons for this choice. Its rationality 
can be founded only on arguments which are generally exogenous 
to the models used. In the present state of economic theory, 
any type of rationing whatever might be possible, in particu­
lar a proportional reduction in working hours. There would 
then be no totally unemployed people, but all individuals 




























































































cess. It would therefore be possible to fix working hours in 
such a way that the whole available active population would be 
employed, i.e. in such a way that the disequilibrium of the 
labour market would be shared among all instead of borne by a 
few. Unemployment would then have an entirely different na­
ture; it would no longer be an attribute of the individual,
1)but a characteristic of the system as a whole.
This solution implies the meeting of at least three con­
ditions :
- that work is homogeneous and men interchangeable, oth­
erwise working hours should be differentiated according to the 
respective availability of different categories of workers;
- that production processes actually allow a "substitu­
tion" between labour services and labour force;
- that the wage fund is redistributed between the unem­
ployed and those at work, i.e. that sharing out work is not 
simply a means of increasing the leisure of the active em­
ployed population. If the generous idea of sharing work 
serves as a pretext for redistributing the national income be­
tween the actively employed and employers, with the unemployed 
left out entirely, that had better be said. But then one 
should not in the same context deplore the lack of competitiv- 
ity as the result of a growth in wage costs.
These conditions, particularly the last one, are imposed 
by the very premises of the reasoning. Long-term growth pros­
pects are limited, and labour hence becomes a relatively abun­




























































































enough places." The Malthusian illusion of the excessive num­
bers of men raises its head again. But there are no lessons 
from history here, or at least they are ambiguous. The reduc­
tion in working time has characterized economic and social evo­
lution since the industrial revolution. (Let us remember the 
times of Engels, where children's working hours had to be regu­
lated to stop them exceeding 12 hours a day.) If this sharing 
out of work was possible yesterday, why should it not be tomor­
row?
Since 1965, the trend to a progressive reduction in hours 
worked has been general in all countries. A reduction in the 
legal working hours would, in this reasoning, only anticipate 
the trend and hasten the necessary adjustments in favour of em­
ployment.
But it is one thing to take note of spontaneous develop­
ments that take place against a background of economic and so­
cial progress. It is another to seek to constrain these devel­
opments and to justify this constraint by the absence of pros-
2)pects for progress. The reduction of working hours is in it­
self an end of our economic system, but it is doubtful that it 
constitutes a means towards a better distribution of scarcity 
in a crisis period. The conditions set out above are, of 
course, very unlikely to be met. The study of the consequences 
of the reduction of working time does not therefore proceed by 
simple arithmetic, but calls for a consideration of the whole 
set of interdependencies that characterize the functioning of 
the economic system. In practice, this means that econometric 





























































































Evolution of weekly working hours 
(Source: I.L.O. Labour Force Statistics)
Total non-farm sectors
reduction in working time. Such an exercise, however, proves 
difficult and doubtful, for two fundamental reasons. The 
first is that the modelling of the production processes and 
their time dimension is still a largely unexplored area of 




























































































duction in working time represents a structural change--social 
processes are in general not reversible--and one does not know 
how it will affect the behavioural relations in the model. The 
reliability of the simulation results is therefore less the 
greater the proposed reduction in working hours.
I - ECONOMETRIC MODELS
Econometric models cannot in general endogenously deter­
mine the direct effects of a reduction in working hours on the 
production process. The ambiguities in theorizing, combined 
with the lack of sufficient examples from the past— which were 
in any case in a very different economic context--explain this 
difficulty. A reduction in the legal hours of work thus re­
mains outside the field of .observation and experimentation of 
the models. The direct effects are therefore a priori the ob­
ject of alternative hypotheses, which constitute different var­
iants for study:
- VThat is the effect on productivity of changes in working 
hours?
- Does the reduction in working hours entail a reduction 
in the duration of capital utilisation and productive capacity?
A third a priori hypothesis relates to the conditions surround­
ing the reduction in working time, i.e. mainly to wages:
- Is the reduction in working time accompanied by a shar­
ing of income--i.e. a reduction in monthly income with un­
changed hourly wages— or does it instead lead to an increase in 




























































































undergo any reduction if the decrease in working hours is a 
substitute for an already planned or foreseeable wage in­
crease, i.e. if it leads the workers to renounce other 
claims.
On the basis of a priori hypotheses concerning these 
effects and conditions, many simulations have been carried 
out in most European Community countries. Apart from the 
quantitative differences in result--the models used have 
different specifications, even if they derive from the same 
theoretical line--they allow a number of significant con­
clusions to be drawn.
1) Employment always increases less than proportion­
ately to the reduction in working hours. In other words, 
the total number of hours worked in the economy diminishes, 
whatever be the hypothesis considered. In all simulations 
done for France using the DNS model, the one corresponding 
to a maximum effect on employment provides for a percentage 
increase in employment less than half that in the reduction 
in hours worked. The gain in employment corresponding to a 
progressive shortening of the working week from 40 to 35
hours would on the most favourable conditions be 880,000
3)instead of some two million at the end of five years.
2) When account is taken of all the likely effects 
brought about by a reduction in working hours— including 
corrective policies applied to reduce the external disequi- 
librium--the models have brought out that the effect on em­




























































































conditions set out in the introduction: maintenance of hours
of utilization of capital, i.e. of productive capacity; and re­
duction in monthly wage income proportionate to the reduction 
in working hours. The models generally assume no long-term 
productivity crains. If however, despite these favourable con­
ditions, employment does not rise in proportion to the reduc­
tion in working hours, the reason lies chiefly in two linked 
effects:
- The compensatory recruitment is not immediate, which, 
combined with the assumption of maintenance of capacity, im­
plies a transitory increase in productivity, known under the
4)name of productivity cycle.
- It follows that the wage fund, demand and production 
costs undergo a relative reduction, as does the growth rate of 
the gross domestic product. The share-out of work and income 
does not therefore take place identically, since production 
shows a slight decline (varying according to model, but always 
present).
- On these hypotheses, shortening working hours becomes a 
powerful means of reducing both the disequilibrium in welfare 
budgets (particularly the social security deficit) and the ex­
ternal deficit.
3) The models differ more in quantitative evaluation when 
the hypothesis of wage compensation is considered. This im­
plies, immediately following the cut in working hours, an in­
crease in hourly wage rates, and with productive capacity un­




























































































the transitory growth in productivity. The increase in wage 
costs is in fact exactly equal to the costs per unit produced 
of the extra recruitment carried out by the firms. The wage 
compensation thus brings about two contradictory effects, 
which explain the divergences among the models. On the one 
hand, the increase in the wage fund leads to an increase in 
effective demand. On the other, the arowth in wage costs 
damages the competitivity of firms if it leads to inflation, 
and reduces their profitability if it does not. Depending on 
whether the models favour the first or the second of these 
effects, they will deduce overeffectiveness of the measure 
for employment (as in the METRIC model) or an attenuation in 
its positive effects (as in DMS). The following table gives 
a picture of the divergences between models from different 
countries.
Independently of these divergencies, which relate to the 
different specifications of certain relationships, particu­
larly the investment function, the simulations generally do
not take account of feedback effects of the evolution of the
5)economy on economic policy.
The hypothesis of wage compensation can be analysed in 
relation to the first column of the table, as a measure of 
"recovery" of economic activity through consumption. Its 
success or failure (always in relation to the opposite hy­
pothesis) will depend on whether the external equilibrium has 
constraining force or not, i.e. whether a worsening in the 
trade deficit will bring about a corrective policy or not.





























































































Effects on employment of a reduction in working hours, on vari­
ous hypotheses of wage compensation
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A plus (+) in the first column indicates a positive effect on 
employment; a minus (-) a negative effect. A ++ in the second 
column means an accentuation of the positive effect; a +- a re­
duction in this effect with the overall effect remaining fa­
vourable. Where only one sign appears in the second column, it 
indicates either that the overall effect of the reduction in 
working hours is negative on the assumption of wage compensa­
tion (sign -); or that this effect remains positive but is more 




























































































effects expected from the measure, since it would use as an 
instrument the reduction of effective demand. The fact that 
the "external constraint" bears differently on the countries 
considered probably explains the divergencies in their con­
clusions. One need not therefore be astonished that v/age 
compensation has a positive effect in the Federal Republic 
of Germany.
When on the other hand the external balance has con­
straining force, i.e. when the government's financial and
monetary policy is endogenized, a "trade-off" would exist
6 )between the change in real wages and employment. This 
trade-off implies that any increase in real wages takes 
place to the detriment of employment.
4) Since it is an object of negotiation, the question 
of wage compensation can theoretically be dealt with. That 
of the effect of reduction of working hours on the duration 
of utilization of capital is of quite a different nature, 
and implies a knowledge of the determinants of production 
which is still only fragmentary.
The reduction in the duration of utilization of capital 
has clearly negative effects on employment in practically 
all simulations. The numbers of men employed always grow 
less than on the assumption that productive capacity is un­
affected, and even sometimes fall by comparison with the 
reference situation where legal working hours are not 
changed. If in fact production fell, firms' employment 




























































































hours, but unit capital costs would increase whether or not 
there were wage compensation. The effects on the balance of 
trade would obviously be negative, because of both a reduction 
in exports and an increase in imports.
By way of illustration, the following table describes
7)what would, according to DMS, be the effects of a reduction 
in working hours combined with a reduction in the duration of 
capital utilisation in the sector exposed to foreign competi­
tion. The hypothesis considered is that of a reduction from 
40 to 35 hours per week, in steps of one hour per year.
The decrease in the duration of capital utilisation seems 
to cancel out almost entirely the positive effects on employ­
ment of a shortening in working hours, even on the assumption 
of no wage compensation.
We have deliberately confined this brief overview of the 
findings of simulations done using econometric models to their 
qualitative aspects rather than the quantitative ones. On the 
one hand, in fact, the extent of reduction in working hours 
contemplated in the various countries is not the same. On the 
other, the models used differ in their specifications, so that 
the reference situation— the forecast to which the consequenc­
es of the economic policy measure are compared--is not neces­
sarily identical from one simulation to another. A quantita­
tive comparison would imply a prior distinction of what in the 
differences in evaluation of the consequences of shortening 




























































































-  13  -
Effects of a shortening of working hours with reduction in the 
duration of utilization of capital (exposed sector)
(average annual chances over 5 years)
Economic indicator Unit
Reduction 





9/10 hours per 
year in hours 





-GDP in real terms Average % per -0,08 -0,75 -0,83






-Capacity (+) or need 
(-) for financing
-of administrations million F + 9 793 - 12 155 -2 362
-of the Nation (1980) per year + 6 714 - 2 282 +4 432
-Growth in consumer 
prices
average % per 
year
-0,24 +0,56 +0,32
-Growth in purchasing 
pcwer
-annual net gain for average % per
wage workers year -0,75 -0,16 -0,91
-disposable household
income -0,40 -0,27 -0,67




+74,3 - 70 +4,3
Source: preparatorv work on VIIIth Plan, 'Rapport du Comité





























































































It would however seem that the findings of simulations as 
to the direction of the effects on employment of a reduction in 
working hours are comparable. Everything depends on three pa­
rameters: the proportion in which the reduction in working
hours leads to lasting gains in productivity; the proportion in 
which it leads to a fall in productive capacity; the proportion 
in which its cost is supported by firms. If these three pro­
portions are zero, the effect on employment is maximum. The 
models generally assume that the first is zero, with the pro­
ductivity gains envisaged being only transitory. A considera­
tion of positive values for the second and/or third proportion 
generally leads to an attenuation of the positive effects on 
employment. The least favourable configuration is obtained 
when both are equal to 1. But it is precisely the fact that 
these parameters are unknown that constitutes the problem. At­
tempts at quantification have therefore not reduced our uncer­
tainty as to the consequences of a policy of shortening working 
hours.
II - WORKING HOURS, DURATION OF THE PRODUCTION PROCESS AND PRO­
DUCTION CAPACITY
The hypothesis of maintenance of productive capacity used
in the simulations in fact assumes that the problem is solved,
since it implies a substitution between hours worked and men
employed. It therefore has the immediate consequence of a
8 )growth in the demand for labour in terms of men. In other 
words, the shortening of working hours is credited from the 




























































































ingenious arguments to justify the assumption, there is equal­
ly none of ones to contradict it. But their generally ad hoc 
character damages the credibility of the argument. This is 
why it is useful to turn towards theoretical considerations.
When one considers a general representation of production 
processes the idea of substitution between working hours and 
men at work, i.e. between labour services and labour force ap­
pears superficial. Such a representation implies a distinc­
tion between the "agents" of the productive processes (capi­
tal, number of workers) and their services (working hours, du­
ration of capital utilization). Production per unit of time 
is then a function of the "agents"--so many machines combined 
with so many men produce so and so much product per hour— and 
total production in a given period is proportional to the du­
ration of the production process. This cannot be confused 
with working hours unless there is only one shift. This theo­
retical outline allows some interesting conclusions to be
drawn, which we shall only mention in the context of this ar-
. . , 9)t i d e :
- A reduction in working hours does not lead to the for­
mation of an extra shift to keep up the production level un­
less it reaches a certain proportion defined by very strict 
conditions. If these conditions are met, the duration of cap­
ital utilization increases, with unchanged production. The 
transition to an extra shift is accompanied by a reduction in 
the number of men per shift, but total employment increases in 
a proportion equal on a first approximation to that of the re­




























































































- If the reduction in hours does not have the extent nec­
essary for this critical proportion, production falls. In any
case at unchanged wage rates, optimal employment is independent
1 0)of working hours. In order for productive capacity to be
maintained, the fall in the duration of capital utilization 
would have to be compensated for by an increase in employment. 
But this is only possible if the wage rate goes down. Income 
per worker would then undergo a reduction more than proportion­
ate to that in working hours. The increase in the number of
men employed when the duration of capital utilization is re-
1 1 )duced implies in effect a decrease in labour productivity.
One must of course step back somewhat from these theoreti­
cal results, especially because they proceed from statics and 
assume that capital is cons-tant. But they allow a better un­
derstanding of the productive process because they take account 
of the relations between production time, working hours and ca­
pacity. They lead one to think that the most probable result 
of a policy of a progressive but slight reduction in working 
hours would be a fall in production capacity.
However, even if the reduction in working hours is below
the critical proportion, this fall need not be proportional to
that in working hours except in extreme circumstances which im-
1 2 )ply the meeting of at least three conditions:
- There is no excess capacity ("the margins of production 
capacity with recruitment" are at their optimum level);




























































































- No investment is made to compensate for the fall in
, .. <4. 1 2 ) productive capacity.
If one of these conditions is not met, the fall in productive 
capacity would be below that in working hours to an extent 
that depends precisely on the available margins of capacity, 
the gains in productivity or the investments. For instance, 
in the simulation done by the Danish Finance Ministry, the 
question of loss of capacity does not play an important part, 
since on the hypothesis that it takes place, it encourages 
sufficient investment to compensate for its negative effect 
on employment. This case is obviously extreme, but it draws 
attention to a causality that the models generally ignore,
1 3 )between reduction in working hours and investment.
The proportion in which a relatively slight reduction in
working hours ought to bring about a reduction in productive
capacity should therefore be positive, though less than 1.
Jacques Dreze has estimated, for the Belgian economy, that on
the assumption that the cost of the cut in working hours is
2/3 supported by the workers, this proportion ought to be
less than 1/4 in order for the effects on employment of the
1 4)proposed policy to be favourable.
Ill - WORKING HOURS AND PRODUCTIVITY
The question of the "dilemma" of productivity has been 
widely discussed in all the works dealing with the effects of 
shortening working hours. There is a dilemma because the 
maintenance of productive capacity calls for an increase in 




























































































on employment are thereby attenuated. We have seen that the ad­
justment of actual to desired employment generates a productivi­
ty cycle, but that the resulting growth in productivity is in an 
inverse relation to the speed of the adjustment. In other words, 
if the firm proceeds instantly to compensatory recruitment, la­
bour productivity would not change. In any case, this process 
is only transitory, and does not affect labour productivity in 
the long term. In most models, labour productivity is therefore 
not affected by a reduction in working hours.
However, there is a convergent series of studies concluding
instead that there are lasting effects on productivity of a re-
1 5 )duction in working hours, and a survey done in 1978 by the 
journal L 1 us ine nouvclle indicates that firms would initially 
if not primarily react to auch a measure by trying in all ways 
to increase productivity. Other surveys have confirmed this 
finding.1
It is our intention here, without prejudging the direction 
of the causal links between changes in working hours and changes 
in productivity, to bring some theoretical considerations to 
bear on the relation between these two variables and to present 
the results of an empirical exploratory study.
Recent developments in the economic theory of labour con­
flicts have shown that there is a trade-off between the union 
claims regarding working conditions, primarily working hours, 
and those regarding wages. Increases in productivity allow both 




























































































In the neoclassical approach to the supply of labour, the 
expected growth in productivity and therefore in real wages 
brings about an intertemporal effect of substitution between 
work and leisure which may be reflected in a reduction in the 
individual supply of labour.
More specifically, since the end of the fifties, the in­
crease in hourly productivity of labour has in fact been ac­
companied by a fall in the annual working hours, compensated 
by a smaller growth in the purchasing power of the average 
wages. In this evolution, the increase in productivity there­
fore seems to be a factor determining the reduction of working 
hours.
The Marxist concepts of surplus value— Marx was one of 
the rare authors to deal with the problem of working hours—  
allow emphasis to be made on the existence of a trade-off be­
tween working hours and productivity, but this time from the 
point of view of firms.
The reduction in absolute surplus value (which depends on 
the length of the working day) leads firms to seek ways to in­
crease relative surplus value, which varies in direct propor­
tion to productivity. This means is of course the accumula­
tion of capital, i.e. the investment. It is therefore the 
prospect of productivity growth that leads workers to demand 
and firms to accept a reduction in working hours.
Expectations of lasting productivity gains therefore seem




























































































We have attempted a rough empirical test of this relation­
ship. Medium-term expectations of productivity developments are 
not observational data, and we have formulated a hypothesis re­
garding their formation.
Productivity has a "technological" component depending on 
the productive combination of the factors (equipment, labour 
skills) and the organization of production. We assume that the 
firm is prudent in forecasting future technology, because of a 
twofold uncertainty: firstly regarding technical progress, and
secondly regarding its own financial situation, which may slow 
down implementation of productivity investments. Firms will ex­
pect productivity gains to continue on the basis of existing 
technical standards.
The second component of the expectations is of an economic 
nature. For a given technology, lacs in adjusting the produc­
tion factors to their desired level determine short-term fluctu­
ations in productivity. It is our hypothesis that firms form 
their expectations of productivity on the basis of a normal rate 
of utilization of productive capacity. It is therefore poten­
tial productivity rather than actual productivity that consti­
tutes our reference.
The relationship between working hours and expected produc­
tivity has been compared with statistical data from three coun­
tries (France, Italy, United Kingdom). The econometric results 
and the method of estimation used are described in the annex.
The partial nature of the relationship and the uncertainties re­




























































































from proceeding to draw quantitative conclusions on the bases
1 8)of these results. But our aim was not to make quantitative
forecasts on the basis of these relationships, but to look for 
a confirmation of a hypothesis, mainly that there is a struc­
tural relation between working hours and productivity in the 
medium term; and such relation does seem to exist in the three 
countries.
Whatever be the causal links between these two variables, 
and our hypothesis favours that going from economic growth to 
working hours, a reduction in legal working hours will proba­
bly lead to lasting productivity gains. But this conclusion 
is not so negative as it seems regarding the effects of such a 
measure on employment. One cannot in fact lose on both 
grounds; an increase in productivity ought to partly compensate 
for the negative effects of the reduction in working hours on 
productive capacity.
In any case, neither one of these effects is independent 
of the evolution in labour cost since the latter in part de­
termines both the developments in productivity, through its 
influence on investment, and that of profitable capacity, at 
least in the short term.
IV - THE QUESTION OF WAGE COMPENSATION
The question of the increase in wage rates is clearly not 
independent of the diagnosis one makes on the present economic 
recession. If there exist excess capacities, if the problem 




























































































in working hours will have the more effect on employment if it 
is accompanied by an increase in wage rate, i.e. by total wage 
compensation.
If instead the diagnosis is that of a shortage of capacity, 
of a lack of profitability, then wage compensation will lead at 
best to inflation and devaluation, at worst to a worsening of 
unemployment.
But a policy of shortening working hours is better founded 
on the second diagnosis, since it assumes that employment (in 
terms of hours worked) has reached a level that is hard to ex­
ceed, and that therefore unemployment must be shared differently 
among workers. As we have stressed, this policy amounts to sub­
stituting one rationing scheme by another; to acting on the ef­
fects rather than on the causes. If this diagnosis is well
19)founded, other policies are possible and perhaps preferable, 
since organizing the rationing of labour may have a number of 
consequences that must be made explicit.
The reduction in working hours and proportionately of in­
come is unacceptable to the worker unless the marginal "disutil­
ity" of labour compensates exactly for the utility of the frac­
tion of income that he is giving up. Were this not the case, 
were the first less than the second, the worker would seek means 
of loosening the constraints facing him. The risk of seeing a 
dual labour market emerging is therefore associated with such a 
policy. But this risk does nothing more than replace another 
one: the existence of a sizeable number of completely unem­




























































































economy. A second consequence may be an increase in demand 
for part-time employment; but the unions are opposed in almost 
all European countries to an expansion in part-time work, 
since it would accentuate the discrimination between a primary 
and a secondary labour market.
The union strategy is precisely to avoid such effects by
calling always and everywhere for total wage compensation.
This is part of a rigorous logic aimed at preventing expansion
of an ill-controlled area of the labour market, and on the
other hand at combatting a policy of passive adaptation of the
supply of labour to employment. ,:It must be recognized that
the reduction in working hours is not genuinely a collective
21 )demand raised by the majority of workers."
An approach to the condition set out previously implies 
both partial wage compensation and a contraction of wage 
scales. The impact of these measures on firms will be differ­
entiated according to the employment structure necessary for 
their functioning. Another possibility is for the State budg­
et to take over all or part of the wage compensation.
Shortening working hours therefore generally implies com­
pensating, at least partly but also in a differentiated man­
ner, for its effects on workers' incomes. Recent French expe­
rience shows this well, difficult as it may be to know what 
the wage increases might have been if the working week had not 
been cut by an hour. In a dynamic perspective, it is the dif­
ference between this hypothetical situation and the actual 





























































































If it is true that the present situation can be analysed as 
a situation of classical unemployment ("too" high real wages), 
then a better alternative would exist to a shortening of working 
hours. A reduction in wage rates would have positive effect on 
both employment and production. The problem is knowina what is 
the elasticity of employment in relation to real wages. If this 
elasticity is too small, such a policy would be completely im­
practicable, since the wage cut needed to restore full employ-
22)ment would be too great.
But is this diagnosis well founded? Recent work by the 
OECD and the EEC seem to prove this. They use a concept created 
ad hoc, "the real wage gap", regarded as measuring the differ­
ence between the real wage and its equilibrium level. This gap 
is supposed to be notably positive for Belgium, France, and Ita­
ly .. . but also for Japan. Serious theoretical and empirical
doubts may therefore be cashed on the significance of this gap
23)as a measure. Another diagnosis might be formulated, leading
24)to a different policy.
o
o o
Our rapid survey of the problems raised by cutting working 
hours as an employment policy is probably too negative. This is 
due more to the philosophy underlying this type of measure than 
to the "scientific" knowledge of its consequences. Simulations 
done using econometric models ought as we have seen to be ana­
lysed with circumspection. The uncertainty in their quantita­




























































































of the direct effects of shortening working hours; but these 
effects are not very well known. Some of its indirect effects 
cannot, moreover, be taken into account. Would a considerable 
reduction in working hours bring with it a change in consump­
tion patterns?
This uncertainty is combined with those regarding the di­
agnosis one makes on the situation of the economy, and regard­
ing the probable development of its international environment.
Shortening working hours is a policy consisting in adapt­
ing to prospects felt to be bad for the future, rather than 
trying to modify them. It also pertains to a new system of 
international relations, "competition through depression". It 
is our conviction that the context in which it is implemented 
--adjustment of the supply of labour rather than of the em- 
ployment--leads wage earners to perceive it as a constraint. 
Its ambition is not to absorb unemployment but to distribute 
it differently. Things would be different if it were taken in 
the context of a positive sum game. But precisely its chances 
of success are subordinated to the hypothesis of no increase 
in productivity.
Alternatively, one might regard our societies as having 
become sufficiently rich to allow for less work. Why then im­
pose a redistribution of income among workers alone? Why not 
think of a bolder redistribution not only of income but also 




























































































A N N E X
THE RELATION BETWEEN WORKING HOURS AND PRODUCTIVITY (FRANCE,
ITALY AND THE UNITED KINGDOM)*
1. Method of estimation
The variable "potential hourly productivity" is constructed 
on the basis of the endogenous variable of hours worked.
An estimation using the method of ordinary least squares 
would therefore not give estimators converging in probabil­
ity. The method of instrumental variables was therefore 
used. Potential hourly productivity was first estimated as 
a function of potential productivity per worker, the growth 
rate of the gross domestic product and investment. The es­
timated value of potential hourly productivity was then in­
troduced as an explanatory variable into the relation.
2. Results
The variables are defined as rates of variation.
Their definition is as follows:
H = weekly hours of work recorded by firms 
Q = gross domestic product
I = investment in equipment including leasing, in con­
stant national currency 
Q/N = potential productivity per head
q*= estimated potential hourly productivity
*The authors would like to thank Giancarlo Rossi for doing the 




























































































The data are quarterly and apply to the period from 1963 
(first quarter) - 1980 (fourth quarter). The rates of varia 
tion are defined in percentage with a lag of four quarters.
The figures in brackets under the regression coefficients 
represent the t of Student, R is the correlation coefficient 
DW is the value obtained from the DURBIN-WATSON test, y7 is 
the first order autocorrelation coefficient.
FRANCE
H = -0,11 §* + 0,01 Q
(-3,26) (1,5)
R2 = 0,9; DW = 1,05; = 0,9
- Estimation of potential hourly productivity 
<5y = 1 ,3 7 + 0,88 (Q/N) + 0,01 I - 0,012 Q 
(2, ) (9,38) (0,91) (0,4)
R2 = 0,89
ITALY
• • •H = -0,1 1 §* + 0,644 Q
(-5,28) (8,46)
R2 = 0,73; DW = 1,91; = 0,5
- Estimation of potential hourly productivity
5* = 3,2 + 0,503 (Q/N) - 0,045 I - 0,011 Q 






























































































H = -0,3 k* + 0,35 Q 
(4,91) (8,69)
R2 = 0,65; DW = 2,14; <3 = 0,3 
- Estimation of potential productivity
<3*= 1,11 + 0,66 (Q/N) - 0,003 I - 0,0009 Q 
(2,26) (33) (0,5) (0,1)
R2 = 0,98
3. Some observations
The French relationship shows a high first order auto-cor 
relation.
In the estimations of potential hourly productivity, the 






























































































1) Other methods of rationing are obviously possible and
used: lowering the retirement age, extending compulsory
schooling, lengthening annual holidays, etc. Though they 
do not have the same consequences as those of cutting 
working hours, they proceed on the same philosophy: ad­
justing the supply of labour to employment instead of em­
ployment to the supply of labour.
2) The effects on employment of the 1936 introduction of the 
40-hour week are controversial (cf. A. Sauvy). This was 
a great and necessary social conquest; but while it may 
be legitimate not to separate the economic from the so­
cial, it is not legitimate to seek at any cost to justify 
a piece of social progress that is good in itself by 
doubtful economic benefits.
3) These simulations were done as part of the preparatory 
work for the plan. Cf. Y. Barou and J. P.igaudiat (1983; 
Chapter 2).
4) The models assume that the recruitment behaviour of firms 
is similar whether they have to cope with the needs of an 
increase in demand or those of a reduction in working 
hours.
5) There are of course exceptions. Cf. INSEE (80a).




























































































7) A shortening in working hours implies, on the DMS model, a 
corresponding reduction in productive capacity, while in 
METRIC it is entirely compensated for by a growth in labour 
productivity (cf. G. Oudiz, E. Raoul and H. Sterdvniak, 
1979).
8) In the DMS model, the growth in the demand for labour is 
more than proportionate to the reduction in hours worked, 
since the maintenance of productive capacity calls for the 
use of older ecruipment.
9) For a formal demonstration, refer to the article by J.P. 
Fitoussi and N. Georgescu-Roegen (1980).
10) It is only because authors habitually confuse labour force 
and labour services in representing the production function 
that this result is unknown. It recalls Karl Marx's objec­
tion to Nassau Senior's assertion that profit was earned 
during the last hour of the working day. For Karl Marx, it 
was instead proportional to the total number of hours 
worked.
11) As in vintage models such as DMS.
12) On this point see, in particular, Y. Barou, F. Perronet and 
F. Rocherieux (1982) and Y. Barou and J. Rigaudiat (1983).
13) The inverse connection is clearly better known and more 
studied (cf. G. Tahar, 1981, 1982).




























































































15) Cf. in particular, E. Denison (1967) and E. Malinvaud 
(1973) .
16) Cf. Y. Barou, J. Rigaudiat and A. Doyelle (1982).
17) This relationship may of course be given another inter­
pretation. Shortening working hours may be the means 
for employers to secure acceptance for a further in­
crease of productivity (Cf. Y. Barou, F. Peronnet and 
F. Pocherieux, 1982).
18) Our method of estimation has moreover not allowed elim­
ination of the autocorrelation of remainders in the re­
lationship estimated for the French data.
19) Cf. J.P. Fitoussi and D.M. Nuti (1982).
20) Cf. Commission of European Communities (1982).
21) Journal CFDT "Aujourd'hui", January 1982.
22) Cf. J. Drèze (1979).
23) Cf. G. Basevi, 0. Blanchard, VI. Buiter, R. Dornbush and 
R. Layard (1983) .
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